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NATO’s Internal Deepening, Endurance, and Expansion:
Economic Incentives and Gains as an Explanatory Complement
to Realist Alliance Theory
Abstract
NATO endured the end of the Cold War in 1991, its members deepened their commitment
to the alliance, and it expanded considerably. Its survival fundamentally challenges the
logic of realism, prompting two essential questions. First, is it possible to salvage realist
alliance theory in the face of its apparent failure to explain NATO's continuing operation?
This article contends that realism is repairable and salvageable in this context. Second, if
realism is still a viable argument about NATO's endurance, how can it explain it? This
article adds a complementary and still-missing explanation to realism based on economic
incentives and gains. It argues that economic considerations such as the high cost and
complexity to research, design, develop, and produce cost-efficiently modern,
sophisticated, and technically complex weapon systems represented a substantial financial
undertaking for NATO's great power members. The unparalleled economic burden
prompted allies to pull resources together instead of seeking security unilaterally or
through other alignment alternatives. The economic imperative of the modern defense
industry is an essential and overlooked variable among realist and non-realist perspectives.
Economic incentives affected in unprecedented ways the strategic calculus of NATO's great
powers and, thus, causes their increased commitment to the alliance, its endurance, and
expansion.
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Introduction
Military alliance dynamics and theory rest on realims’s balance of power
assumptions. One fundamental presupposition in the realist paradigm
postulates that states facing a common geostrategic external threat will
form a military alliance to secure themselves, survive, and remain
independent.1 Thus, scholars routinely challenge and criticize classicaland neo-realism for failing to account for the internal deepening,
endurance, and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) after the disintegration of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.
In essence, its principal geostrategic threat and, admittedly in realism, one
of the fundamental reasons for its formation and continued operation for
well over four decades.2 As Mearsheimer remarked in 1990, “the Soviet
threat provides the glue that holds NATO together.”3
Still more puzzling from realism’s viewpoint and its attendant balance of
power theory are two crucial historical outcomes. First, NATO great
powers' lack of efforts to balance each other, the United States, or other
rising great powers unilaterally or through alternative multinational
military coalitions. This outcome is unlike earlier historical instances at
the conclusions of the two World Wars in 1918 and 1946 respectively.4
Second, NATO members' incremental commitment to the alliance caused
a remarkable internal deepening of their collaboration and policy
coordination during the post-Cold War period. These results are
particularly prominent in regards to their defense and procurement
policies. These confounding conclusions prompt two fundamental
questions. First, is it possible to salvage realist alliance theory in light of
the apparent failure to explain NATO's survival, deepening, and expansion
in the absence of its geostrategic enemy or external threat? This article
contends that realism is repairable and salvageable in this context. Second,
if realism is still a viable argument about NATO's endurance, how can it
explain it? This article offers an economic-incentive-driven alternative
explanation to complement it.
In addressing the questions above, this article's purpose is three-fold:
First, it advances a complementary (not competing) and hitherto-missing
alternative explanation from within the realist paradigm. It adds to the
fundamental premises of this school of thought, comprising several
prominent variants such as Classical, Structural, and Neo-classical
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realism. This focus will help to explain NATO's remarkable endurance,
deepening, and expansion since 1991. The analysis concentrates on the
twenty-five years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, the study
articulates an economic-incentive-driven model, based on the nature and
market-character of the modern and highly sophisticated defense industry.
The article argues that economic incentives and gains promoted an intense
and unprecedented level of commitment by the great powers to the
alliance. Ultimately, such a level of commitment and collaboration eased
NATO's internal deepening and, consequently, its endurance and
expansion. Third, the essay broadly presents and examines available
empirical evidence from the defense industry to substantiate the
economic-based argument advanced here.
Now, it is necessary to clarify four fundamental points that the study does
not aim to accomplish: First, it does not attempt to debunk other
alternative explanations such as, for example, the central or hegemonic
role played by the U.S. in NATO's endurance, or even constructivist
arguments about the transformed institutional nature of NATO. Second,
the study does not claim that economic interests dominate political and
security calculations leading to NATO’s survival. Nonetheless, as
Mearsheimer asserts, “economic calculations are hardly trivial”
considerations for nations-states.5 Accordingly, the article demonstrates
that economic incentives and gains also contribute to NATO's extended
operation. Third, the study does not attempt to advance another economic
theory of military alliance formation, operation, or termination.6 Fourth, it
does not contend that NATO is a necessary condition for member states to
achieve gains and secure international cooperation. That is, states do not
need a formal military alliance to cooperate on weapons projects.
Nonetheless, starting from the realist perspective and since the alliance
remains operational since 1991, this article accepts NATO's perplexing
endurance in the absence of a formidable external threat like the former
Soviet Union was from 1947 until 1991. Thus, the scope of this article is to
provide an additional, complementary, and reasonable explanation based
on economic incentives and gains.
Accordingly, based on the three objectives outlined above, the first section
contextualizes empirically and theoretically NATO's paradoxical
endurance, deepening, and expansion. The idea is to frame the contention
of this article. Second, an examination of realism in the context of NATO's
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survival follows the order of the article. This discussion flows from
classical definitions of power, threat, and interest, and the ways in which
these socio-political dimensions shape the alliance choices of states.
Short of outright rejecting realist arguments and, preferably, adding
complementarity to realist alliance theory, the third section introduces
and discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the political-economic
dimension of power politics or Realpolitik. It expounds on the economic
rationale for the endurance of the military alliance. Based on economic
concepts and theory, the essay discusses several key theoretical
components of the economic-incentive-driven model. These serve as
critical building blocks of an alternative and novel economic explanation
of NATO's continuing operation.
The economic angle emphasized in this article is a crucial theoretical
aspect overlooked mainly by security and military alliance dynamics
theorists and, thus, it is missing from political realism. This essay brings it
back into the discussion. Thus, the fourth major section analyzes the
evidence of the post-Cold War alliance dynamics, procurement policies of
key member states, and the ways in which this evidence manifests itself in
various multinational defense projects. The aim is to explain why NATO's
great powers deepened their collaboration and continued their internal
military commitment after 1991, even in the absence of imminent external
threats. The fifth and final section offers concluding remarks from a realist
perspective on this most intriguing historical development and theoretical
puzzle.

Historical and Theoretical Contextualization of NATO’s
Paradoxical Endurance
The unraveling of the Soviet Bloc began in Poland in June 1989.
Furthermore, massive protests throughout Eastern Europe, the collapse of
the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and domestic-level conditions
operating inside the former Soviet Union, ultimately caused its collapse
and ended the Cold War. Nonetheless, NATO perversely still endures
despite the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet
Union—the principal rival and threat that, according to realist logic,
prompted the military alliance's formation and justified its military and
geostrategic operation until 1991. Further, well over a quarter of a century
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after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Treaty
Organization, NATO intriguingly expanded its membership, and kept its
internal structure and organization virtually intact. Also, it invested in new
military capabilities, and engaged in a variety of new military missions.
These developments deepened its members’ commitment, and caused the
redefinition of NATO’s original geostrategic function and purpose.7
Some argue that NATO’S survival is not surprising. Instead, it is the result
of U.S. political and military incentives and interests to maintain a degree
of political and military control and governance over Europe and its
allies.8 Others claim that the Europeans and the North Americans never
indeed accepted the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its
replacement by the Russian Federation as the absolute disappearance of
the external geostrategic threat to NATO's allies.9 For example, based on
constructivist assumptions, Pouliot explains the prolonged tension
between NATO and Russia after the end of the Cold War and into the late
1990s. This group of scholars contends tensions became particularly acute
as President Vladimir Putin's ascendance as a powerful autocrat
materialized and expanded in Russia. Hence, the need for maintaining
NATO in place.10
Moreover, other experts claim that, as an institution, NATO enables an
exchange between some European members seeking offensive capacity
and the United States pursuing legitimacy from its European partners. The
enablement of the terms of this exchange provides NATO its reason or
justification for existence.11 In addition, Sweeney defines NATO as an
institution that can adjust to changing history.12 Even others contend that
the abrogation or survival of a military alliance, like NATO, is “sensitive to
changes in core supporting domestic coalitions,” but the termination of
alliances is less likely among democratic than among nondemocratic
states. Hence, NATO survives.13 From the institutional perspective, others
focus on the constitution and re-constitution of NATO’s roles from its
inception to its anomalous survival since 1991.14
On a purely structural perspective, some see that the collapse of the Soviet
Union transformed a bipolar world into a more fluid multipolar security
system that ushered in multiple, flexible military alliance opportunities
among the Russians, Chinese, and other potential international state
actors against the United States and the other NATO great power allies.
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These outcomes would have been particularly the case, had the military
alliance been disbanded as were the cases in previous historical instances
such as the Triple Entente and the Central Powers after the First World
War in 1918, and the Allied Powers that defeated the Axis Powers after the
Second World War in 1946.
Based on historical precedence and realist theoretical reasoning, many
experts believed that NATO's members would dissolve the alliance. The
assumption was that, after the end of major systemic or general (hot or
cold) wars, the triumphant military alliance members would usually
disband the alliance based on changing great powers' national interests,
the realignment of powers, and the absence of common systemic threats.
Consequently, some in this group question the future of NATO.15 From a
constructive theoretical standpoint, others still explain NATO as an
unfolding vision and practice that may transform how "we think about
security logic in general, European security in particular, and European
alliance politics specifically."16
It is the latter interpretation, albeit from different theoretical assumptions
and perspectives, that comes closest to the explanation comprised in this
article regarding NATO's internal deepening and, consequentially, to its
endurance and expansion. This interpretation is a puzzling political event
in its own right. Additionally, though, it is counterintuitive, mainly, when
viewed from a realist position and the internal logic of its theories on
military alliance dynamics. First, as discussed above, NATO's central
geostrategic rival—the Soviet Union—disappeared and, thus, with it the
need for a countervailing military alliance. Second, China and Russia have
been individually incapable of counterbalancing and threatening NATO's
conventional forces in Europe and North America for most of the last
twenty-five years. Finally, the end of cold or hot wars and the absence of a
subsequent identifiable threat suggest the dissolution of military alliances
as history extensively reveals. Unquestionably, NATO's deepening,
expansion, and endurance are crucial aspects worth exploring further and
comprehensively in terms of historical, geopolitical, strategic, and
theoretical ramifications.
Several alternative explanations for NATO's endurance are part of the
literature. They comprise multiple elements such as the political interest of
the United States to maintain its global dominance, institutional
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endurance, and reinvention of NATO's purpose and operation,
supranational regional governance dynamics, and cultural and ideological
affinity, to name a few. Notwithstanding the contributions of these
alternative explanations, none attempts to complement or enhance
realism's age-old balance of power dynamics and its attendant military
alliance theory, which would have predicted NATO's dissolution after 1991
and the inception of a new realignment process among former NATO
members and other great powers. Since this was not the outcome, as
posited by the theory, how does realism explain NATO's deepening,
endurance, and expansion?17
This article repairs and expands realism and its internal reasoning about
the determinants for the extension of military alliances. It accomplishes
this goal by explicitly adding an economic-based missing link to its set of
assumptions and logic. Accordingly, it shows an economic rationale that
has stimulated decisions by the United States, Canada, and the great
European powers to deepen their military collaboration and commitment
within NATO. Thus, in addition to the paramount security, political,
institutional, ideological, and geostrategic considerations, economic
interests, and incentives complement and support members’ commitment
to the alliance, as argued in this work.
Burden-sharing among NATO members was never easy or smooth.
Nonetheless, the political economy of the modern defense industry in
terms of technology research, design, development, and cost-effective
production is an essential and missing dimension in the general realist
paradigm. Hartley and Sandler discuss and analyze the burden-sharing
problem by NATO members.18 The great European powers and the North
American NATO members have gained from remaining involved in the
alliance, deepening their internal commitment, and allowing for its
endurance and expansion. This argument is the point of entry of this
article into the discussion about NATO's survival and expansion. It
complements other alternative explanations in the literature in
International Relations and Security Studies. Instead of challenging other
schools of thought and competing explanations, this essay focuses on
enhancing the explanation of the alliance's functional duration.
NATO's endurance and expansion are solid, observable empirical facts. It
is difficult, however, to explain the reason(s) for its progressive internal
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deepening, which, as this article argues, may ultimately be the cause of
these actual outcomes. In order to provide empirical justification for this
essay, it is necessary a succinct review of the preliminary evidence
suggesting NATO's internal deepening by its members' economic
incentives and commitment to the alliance. First, the United States and
other allies are cooperating in multiple defense programs, exceeding
several billion dollars individually over the last several years. Second, the
United Kingdom and the United States are also vital partners in terms of
defense industry cooperation and military materiel sales. They engage in
several common equipment programs. Third, France and Great Britain
have multiple military cooperation programs. They are already building a
Future Combat Air System, which is due to be active in 2030.
These materials and technical multinational, cooperative development
projects outlined above beg the following questions: Why do NATO's great
powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany—continue
to cooperate intensively in military matters? What are the strategic
imperatives that call for the alliance's internal deepening and its ultimate
endurance and expansion? As discussed above, traditional political and
geostrategic justifications for the formation or, in this case, maintenance,
and operation of a military alliance have been tenuous for most of the last
quarter of a century. Starting from a realist perspective, except for the
expected disappearance of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, it is
intriguing that the end of the Cold War did not cause a significant
rearrangement and realignment of all military alliances. It appears as if
great power politics since 1991 descended to a secondary plane in strategic
security considerations. Alternatively, has it?
The analysis of this article builds on the following assumptions:
Realpolitik considerations today are as relevant as ever; that great powers
have not redefined their strategic security interests significantly; and that
the logic of power politics is still one of the vital driving forces in
contemporary world politics. Nonetheless, as discussed above, there have
been essential and unaccounted developments in the political economy of
the defense industry, which have swayed NATO's great powers to deepen
their internal military commitment and multinational cooperation after
the Cold War. The peculiarities of the political economy of the modern
defense industry have made it exceedingly expensive and technically
challenging for most NATO's great powers to exit the military arrangement
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and, instead, pursue its security unilaterally or via an alternative
multilateral military cooperation pact or a different realignment of
systemic forces. It is essential to explore if and how this exceptional
development in alliance dynamics renders obsolete the realist paradigm
and its attendant theories.
Classical realism and neo-realism are predominantly silent on how the
new defense industry's political economy affects the power capabilities of
states, their calculations, and alliance politics and choices among great
powers. Instead of emphasizing the economy and the accumulation of
wealth as the primary state’s objectives, realism traditionally underscores
maximizing and maintaining security, prestige, supremacy, and even
domination.19 The attainment of these objectives does not suggest,
however, that realists neglect the economic dimension of politics
completely, particularly of international politics. While “realists are not in
it for the money,” they do appreciate the economy and the importance of
economic factors.20
Accordingly, neorealist, for example, Kenneth Waltz, in his Theory of
International Politics, devotes an important part of his book to examine
the structural effects on the economy, but, regrettably, nothing to the
economic effects on the structure.21 Notwithstanding such mild neglect,
the newer realist iteration, neo-classical realism, addresses, and
incorporates the domestic economy prominently, the political economy of
national security, and economic statecraft.22 The present work fills the
partial gap in realist theorization about modern military alliance
dynamics. In addition, it demonstrates that the political economy of the
defense industry is an important variable that can potentially affect the
traditional calculations and power of states. In turn, economic
considerations and incentives may transform in unprecedented ways the
logic of modern military alliance politics among great powers. The
economic dimension may complement realist theories of military alliance
dynamics.

Foundations of Military Alliances: Balancing Power, Threats, or
Interests?
Based on realist assumptions, the core objectives of any state in the
international system range from basic survival, security, and
independence to acquire and increase power and status. States count on a
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range of strategic options to accomplish these unilateral preferences.
These include balancing efforts, bandwagoning, offshore balancing, buckpassing, and chain ganging. Balancing and bandwagoning are the most
germane in NATO's case. The first option is the most traditional way by
which nation-states protect their security. Accordingly, they accomplish it
through either self-help or via multilateral military arrangements to
countervail the threat from a rising expansionist and revisionist state.
Second, bandwagoning is the strategy when states join a powerful state
rather than oppose it. This strategy resembles more closely NATO's
alliance structure and dynamic since 1991. Nonetheless, bandwagoning
appears in two versions in the literature. Thus, this study, as others should
too, declines to accept it grossly and without further refinement.
Subsequently, the discussion turns to NATO's historical incongruity in
reference exclusively to realist military alliance theories focus on
bandwagoning and balancing processes.
First, Stephen Walt argues that some states bandwagon because they lose
hope of balancing the aggressor and, instead, ally with a stronger foe to
gain, at least, something from wars. Walt suggests that bandwagoning is a
dangerous strategy, though, and states will bandwagon only if they cannot
balance a threatening enemy. Weak states are more likely to bandwagon
with the threatening state because they may be too weak to balance them
unilaterally. On the other hand, strong states have a better chance of
affecting the outcome of the conflict and are more likely to balance than to
bandwagon.23 Walt's bandwagoning argument in its current form does not
explain why states would continue to be part of an alliance in the absence
of either a general or immediate threat, as is NATO's case since the end of
the Cold War. Admittedly, though, Russia and China could at some point
rise sufficiently to threaten European and North American countries. At
present and over the last twenty-five years, however, both great powers
lack individually or collectively the necessary might to pose a significant
conventional threat to the Europeans and the North Americans. In this
sense, first, it is even more intriguing to confirm that the NATO alliance
continues to exist. Second, that the Europeans bandwagon with the most
powerful actor in the victorious alliance—the United States—rather than
dissolve the alliance after the end of the Cold War as were the historical
cases after the end of the First and Second World Wars' Triple Entente and
the Allied Powers alliances, respectively.
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Second, Randall Schweller may provide a clue as to why powers could ally
even if the threat to their security is tenuous or nonexistent. He introduces
some modifications to the bandwagoning alliance strategy proposed by
Walt. He suggests that Walt mistakes bandwagoning with capitulation,
and falsely attributes this strategy to the coercion of the weaker side by the
strong. According to him, Walt's bandwagoning falsely assumes that states
only look for power to achieve security. This interpretation is possible
because Walt bases his argument on the assumption that "states value
more what they have than what they covet."24 Schweller counters that
some states—the so-called revisionist states—are not satisfied with their
position and, thus, care to increase their power rather than maintain
security.25 Like other theories, Schweller's balance-of-interest alliance
theory cannot explain why the United States and the Western European
states continued their close military cooperation despite the end of the
primary, geostrategic threat in 1991. Schweller's variant, nonetheless, does
explain why the United States and the Europeans would align with each
other against an external threat: They have common interests in
preserving the existing status quo. As he argued against Walt's variant,
states sometimes join an alliance hoping to gain something rather than to
defend from a real threat. Although it does not explain why the NATOs
great power members continued cooperating, deepening their collective
commitment, and expanding the alliance, he does introduce the possibility
of states aligning in order to pursue gains beyond traditional security and
power interests. These theoretical gaps and Schweller's suggestion that
states may bandwagon or remain in an alliance to pursue gains beyond
security suggest that some other causes for military cooperation remain
unaccounted for and, thus, are worth pursuing in this study.
The political-economic argument advanced in this article is one of these
unaccounted causes, and it will nicely complement Schweller's
bandwagoning variant. Some political-economic considerations and
incentives often motivate the individual decisions of NATO’s great powers.
Expectations of economic gains, for example, from the prospect of future
trade benefits, may prompt the behavior of states.26 This conclusion is
seldom part of the reasoning for military alliance formation, operation,
and maintenance. For example, one can argue that genuine pecuniary
interests and incentives primarily motivated the vast military coalition of
35 countries and the United States that fought in the Gulf War against
Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime from 1990-1991. Undoubtedly, some
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countries like Saudi Arabia and other small Gulf states ultimately joined
the coalition out of fear and for security objectives. Nonetheless, there
were number of other states who joined the alliance to pursue real
economic gains. This explanation suggests economic incentives as gains
are part of the fundamental justification and explanation for countries to
join or remain in a military alliance. This angle is consistent with the basic
logic of bandwagoning into a military coalition in exchange for economic
incentives and gains expounded by Schweller.
This article maintains, as Mearsheimer contends, that when security
clashes with economic motivations, security concerns prevail. This work
does not argue against this basic tenet of realism. On the contrary, a
fundamental assumption of this study is that the compatibility of security
and political interests must precede any economic-driven cooperation in
defense-related matters. That is, when security and political
considerations are relatively harmonious, then the tendency for nationstates to cooperate in joint military-production projects to attain economic
gains increases considerably. Given the relative compatibility of interests
among NATO states, they have been cooperating in defense-related
projects, motivated in part by economic calculations.
In addition, as Monteiro argues, this work recognizes that, depending on
the system's polarity, the type, and nature of conflicts and threats vary
accordingly. Independent of the changing conflict-provoking dynamics,
given different polar configurations over a quarter of a century, economicdriven defense cooperation among NATO's great powers members
increased steadily since the end of the Cold War.27 The prevalence of
multinational defense projects among NATO members suggests that
variation in systemic polarity and the type of conflicts as the system
changed from structural unipolarity to multipolarity suggest that
economic-driven military cooperation warrants further scrutiny.
In the following section, the article examines the interactive dynamics of
processes like economies of scale, economies of scope, and several other
economic factors that are at play in the modern defense industry. The
overall impact these economic processes on alliance deepening,
endurance, and expansion ought to include it as an additional explanatory
perspective for NATO's surprising survival in the absence of an external
threat. The article turns next to the discussion of the theoretical
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components of this argument and their attendant individual logics
subsequently.

Economic Rationale: The Theoretical Building Blocks of the
Model
Since the end of the First World War in 1918, technical research,
development, production, and distribution of modern military technology
became exponentially hi-tech and costly. This process has mainly been a
particular lot of a small group of countries that are steep in scientific and
technical expertise. In turn, the scientific, technical, and industrial
communities in these states have made available higher levels of technical
sophistication in weapons systems to the national armed forces. However,
the availability of these technologies comes at an exceedingly high
economic cost. Thus, the defense procurement policies of all states have
been severely affected, calling for new, imaginative ways to keep the armed
forces modernized and at pace with weapons systems developments and
security needs.
Even countries enjoying a relatively wealthy international status, like some
European states and, explicitly, Canada, as revealed by its long-drawn
budgetary, political process to replace its aging fighter planes fleet with the
new, highly sophisticated and expensive F-35 plane, have been forced to be
creative and to reinvent how to protect themselves in resourceful ways.
One alternative has been to remain as a member of NATO—a military
alliance that belongs to a bygone period. While there may be sound
security, political, ideological, and geostrategic justifications for opting to
keep NATO alive, there is, nevertheless, an equally robust economic
rationale for these NATO members to maintain their military and defense
collaboration.
Economic Incentives and Gains as Driving-forces for Cooperation in
Defense-Projects
The economic imperative is an essential and primarily overlooked
determinant that affects and transforms in an unprecedented way the
strategic calculus of great powers within NATO. Thus, the argument
comprised here assumes that the opportunity cost to maintain and
increase technical sophistication in weapon systems creates substantial
incentives for NATO's great power members to remain active and deeply
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involved in this military alliance. Once internal commitment materializes
as the result of political-economic interests, the endurance and expansion
of the alliance ensue in unprecedented fashion.
This section introduces several critical economic concepts that taken
together can help to explain states' decisions to stay in a military alliance
and continue to cooperate in security matters, even beyond the
disappearance of the original strategic objective that fueled the formation
of the coalition. Economies of scale, scope, learning-by-doing, and
research and development costs, among other concepts, provide the
economic building blocks and rationale for this explanatory model. This
essay defines each of these concepts and their respective theoretical
economic logic and shows how each contributed to the political-economic
argument outlined in this article for NATO's surprising internal
deepening, and its consequential expansion and endurance. Further,
bringing back in the economic argument will enhance and complement the
realist theory of military alliance dynamics. The essay distinguishes this as
a realist theory. It contends that the nature and purpose of multinational
coalitions range from purely security objectives—defensive or offensive—to
economic, corporate, political, and diplomatic. The nature of military
alliances is less forgiving than other possible multilateral collaborative
modalities. Thus, the article calls attention to the theory of military
alliance dynamics by underscoring the unique defensive and offensive
operations of cooperative entities such as NATO.28
Realists discuss political-economic considerations mainly under the rubric
of internal and unilateral balancing. According to them, states engage in
internal balance when they augment their capabilities by increasing
economic growth and military spending. In turn, natural resource
endowments, and demographic, economic, military, and technological
capabilities determine the economic potential of countries. However, with
political-economic factors, a different logic ensues. Missing from previous
theoretical positions about military alliance dynamics is a simple but
grossly overlooked economic notion. That is, in cooperation with each
other concerning weapons research, design, development, cost-effective
production, and procurement policies, nation-states may be able to
achieve more capabilities while using fewer individual resources.
Consequently, it makes economic, even if, perhaps, not political sense for
states to cooperate to reduce such costs, provided, of course, their national
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political and security interests are a priori compatible. This work expounds
below each of these political-economic components or building blocks and
interprets their particular relevance for a political-economic alternative
explanation of military alliance dynamics.
Market Imperfections
Scholars criticize classical economic theory because it assumes that
markets are perfect. However, as demonstrated, in specific scenarios, the
allocation of goods and services on markets may be inefficient and
imperfect. These market failures are situations when the actions of agents
to increase their utility might not lead to the optimal outcome.29 There are
many reasons why market failures occur. One of the most important has to
do with the nature of markets. In specific markets, participants can
possess market power and preclude other beneficial transactions from
taking place. Inefficiencies can arise due to limited competition, for
example, in markets where actors are monopolies or monopsonies.30 In
monopolistic markets, an agent will provide goods or services below the
optimal utility level for customers to keep profits high. Monopolies arise
and persevere when barriers to entry in the market are high. Importantly,
first entrants might have an advantage like diminishing costs as the
number of their output increases.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale are among the most frequent market imperfection
cases. Economies of scale imply a change in the efficiency of production,
given changes in production capacity, volume, or quantity.31 Often,
economies of scale originate because of fixed and variable costs, which
decrease per unit of production as the volume of production increases. In
some businesses, increasing the speed of conducted work decreases fixed
costs. Economies of scale may originate due to multiple reasons. For
example, establishing long-term contracts may decrease the purchasing
costs; allowing managers to specialize can increase the speed and quality
of their work; borrowing in large quantities may decrease the interest on
loans; advertising large quantities of goods instead of just one, employing
more efficient technology. In the end, in each of these scenarios, the
average cost of production decreases.
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Fixed Costs and Economies of Scale
Often economies of scale exist due to substantially fixed capital expenses.
In turn, unit cost decreases as the volume of production increases. The
fundamental characteristic of fixed costs is independent of their frequent
and extensive use. They do not fluctuate. Building factories, warehouses,
and investing in equipment are all examples of fixed costs. Of course, there
are current costs associated with these assets, and some of them will likely
vary (variable costs), at least in part, according to the level of output—for
example, maintenance and security.32 However, such costs are minimal
compared to the fixed expenses incurred by companies.
Substantial economies of scale are characteristic of industries with
substantial fixed costs. Industries, which are capital intensive, are usually
the ones with high fixed costs. Examples of such industries are railroads,
aircraft production, semiconductors, and information technology, to name
a few. In these industries, only if the quantity of production is large
enough will unit costs reach the minimum level possible. It is necessary to
have massive investments in production facilities, measured in billions of
dollars, to attain such levels of output.33
Economies of Scope
Panzar and Willig advanced the notion of economies of scope. With
economies of scale, the efficiency of production is a direct consequence of
the volume of production. With economies of scope, however, efficiencies
stem from a variety of products. In other words, diversification of
production achieves critical economic benefits. However, diversification of
product base is only possible if the producer makes frequent use of some
knowledge, expertise, or even a particular asset.34 An example of
economies of scope is a company that promotes a few different products,
reaching more people with the same amount of money spent as compared
to the scenario when different companies specialize in the production of
particular goods. Economies of scope allow the company to cut down the
costs of advertising and branding goods. Usually, economies of scope are
possible when companies start to share separate functions, for example,
finance, and advertising. It also happens when a company sells one of its
products next to another and can use specific outputs as inputs for
others.35
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Learning-by-doing
Learning-by-doing implies increasing efficiency using practice and
perfection. The process of learning implies that companies think, realize
their problems, and then take measures to solve them. Companies might
learn to use their equipment better. Dynamic programming and strategic
planning are fields where learning-by-doing is of primary importance. In
learning-by-doing workforce increases its efficiency by repeating the same
process endlessly. Kenneth Arrow promoted the idea when he coined his
endogenous growth theory incorporating innovations and technical
change into the classical explanation of economic growth. Arrow used the
learning-by-doing to denote learning inside the company.36
Lucas Bretschger showed that there are increasing returns associated with
human capital. According to him, training or, in other words, learning is
fundamental in building human capital.37 Various economists have shown
that learning-by-doing leads countries to greater specialization. Lundberg
studied the Horndal iron factory in Sweden. He observed that the
productivity of the factory increased by 2 percent per year, although it had
no new investments. Wright and Middleton show that in the aircraft
industry, labor productivity and output have increased with time
independent of scale effects.38
The literature in engineering and management supports the notion of
learning-by-doing, which demonstrates the fact that increases in aggregate
output have a dampening effect on unit costs. Although experts within the
aircraft industry knew about the effects, Wright was one of the first who
discussed the phenomenon in his analysis of aircraft manufacturing. These
analyses established that in the 1950s, the U.S. government was
purchasing boats and planes from shipbuilders and aircraft
manufacturers, already incorporated in the budget.39
The Costs of Research and Development
Both military and civil aerospace costs are tremendous, and the costs are
growing at an exponential rate. 40 The historical cost trend arises from
technical progress in each generation, with governments striving to
purchase the latest products to have a competitive edge. Augustine
forecasted that the costs of military production would increase to the
extent that all resources in the defense budget would go to acquire just one
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aircraft. Both Navy and Air Force would have to share this single aircraft
3.5 days each week because they could not afford more. According to
Augustine, the British military would reach the same point a bit earlier
than the United States, and countries with smaller defense budgets would
take even less time. Partly, the rising costs of producing military
equipment cause this, while military budgets fail to keep up with
increasing costs.41 Augustine's prediction centers on rising costs in hightech equipment. He shows that the costs of aircraft have grown fourfold
per decade. This trend is similar to the procurement and acquisition of
helicopters, ships, and tanks, as well as commercial aircraft. Ships and
tanks costs decreased by a two-fold factor per ten years.42 These trends led
to suggestions of an eventual single ship navy, a single tank army, and
Starship Enterprise for the air force.43

Analysis of the Post-Cold War NATO Dynamics
The principal purpose of this article is to find and articulate a sound
answer to the following central research question: Why did NATO's great
powers continue their cooperation in the absence of a direct and
formidable external threat? The answer hinges on economic
considerations and incentives as gains, leading to significant savings in the
research, development, and production functions of military materiel and
operations. After the Cold War, in the absence of an external geostrategic
threat, NATO members did not need to spend as much on expensive and
sophisticated weapons and on keeping large operational infrastructures,
and specialized personnel. Regarding research, design, development, and
efficient production, NATO countries let military industries to consolidate,
engage in trans-border, friendly mergers or economic cooperation, take
advantage of economies of scale, scope and learning by doing, and share in
research and development costs. It appears that for the next twenty-five
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union political competition among
NATO’s great powers yielded to more pragmatic economic imperatives
and calculations. The balance of the analysis comprised here centers only
on NATO’s great powers members and their weapon systems
collaboration. Thus, it excludes the European-Union-based Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) program. This entity promotes multiple
defense collaboration efforts among twenty-five member states.44
This article analyzes a mixture of qualitative and descriptive quantitative
evidence to investigate the main question. The focus is on the behavior of
33
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the most important members of NATO, such as the United States, Canada,
France, Great Britain, and Germany during the post-Cold War period. The
study attempts to shed light on the presence or absence of external threats
and the sustained efforts by NATO's great power members to continue
their military, multinational economic, technological, and strategic
cooperation. Accordingly, this section examined the empirical bases for
NATO's great powers to continue and deepened their military cooperation
internally after the Cold War despite the absence of external threats. The
aim is to test the following hypothesis: Cooperation in military production
of states, with compatible or harmonious national political and security
interests, positively relates to the existence of market imperfections such
as economies of scale, scope and learning-by-doing and escalating
research and development costs, in the absence of external threats.
Several experts have written about economies of scale, economies of scope,
learning-by-doing, and other economic imperfections related to military
production. Harold Asher noted, “the learning curve tended to apply to
airframe production…with unit costs declining in a fairly predictable
pattern as production expanded."45 Malcolm W. Hoag suggests that
prominent production economies of scale do apply with particular
frequency in military applications.46 He argues that this is why
"concentrated sources of supply tend to predominate,"—meaning that
instead of many factories and producers, there are just a few that produce
in large quantities. He illustrates the point with the example of F-iii (TFX),
designed to be the advanced tactical fighter-bomber for both the United
States Navy and the Air Force. Hoag concludes that the same logic applies
to space programs.47
Sandler and Hartley suggest that scale economies per se may have been
only a modest influence on the structure of the defense industry in the
past, though the evidence was more convincing for learning economies
and their impact. Since the 1990s, however, scale economies had a
significant impact as well.48 Dunne suggests that governments now appear
more sensitive to the extra cost incurred by small national production runs
(and the high technology nature of some manufacture) and more receptive
to the argument that "economies of scale need to be met through
international collaboration and industrial restructuring."49
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The analysis of U.S. economies of scale and scope at a time of shrinking
demands led to a massive wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s.
According to Markowski, the degree of cross-sector diversification among
the most significant defense firms suggests that they perceive and value
such economies.50 According to Dunne, a significant driver of economic
restructuring is the growing trans-Atlantic nature of the defense industry.
The process is, on the one hand, the result of European companies'
aspirations to become major players in the U.S. market. On the other
hand, according to Bitzinger, it is the United States' acceptance that
"interoperability requirements, the benefits of cooperative defense
programs, and an increasingly global industrial infrastructure require that
the [U.S. DOD] be prepared to accept the benefits offered by access to the
most innovative, efficient, and competitive suppliers worldwide."51
Various views summarized above point to one critical development: There
are clear indications that since the end of the Cold War, cutting military
costs became one of the major concerns for NATO members. Since the end
of the Cold War, NATO members have not faced comparable external
threats and, thus, have not required high scale production. Some firms
could not keep up with reduced demand and exited the market. Others
consolidated their operations and expanded their markets internationally
to improve their capacity to remain in business. Importantly, though,
NATO members collaborated and produced general orders, which allowed
them to take advantage of scale, scope, and other economies, and to cut
down production and overhead costs. By cooperating beyond immediate
needs, these countries gained by saving from specialization in research,
development, and production costs of defense materiel.
Rising Costs of Sophisticated Weapons and Economic Incentives for
Collaboration
Expensive military technology and rising costs create a vital rationale for
states to engage in military cooperation, namely, collaborative projects.
Collaboration is particularly crucial because substantial fixed costs and
small national orders make it too costly for states to have national
production. Large international orders would allow the average cost of
production to fall over larger volumes of output and make new technology
affordable to collaborating nations. Moreover, rising costs make it
impossible for any single nation in Europe to produce some future
generation of military equipment on their own, for example, sophisticated
35
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fighter and bombers planes. In this sense, only a handful of combat
aircraft companies compete for national contracts to replace aging aircraft.
The Canadian debate about replacing its aging fleet of F-18 Hornets is a
clear illustration.52 Production of a new model will necessitate enormous
resources. These could promote simultaneously the development of a
future generation of combat planes through collaborative projects. Even
advanced technology, such as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) will be
costly.53 Europeans will have to choose between increased collaboration
and importation from other nations, which can afford large batches of
production, such as, for example, the United States.
The study assessed collaboration gains following the square root rule. The
rule implies that the costs of current projects compared to single-nation
production increased by the square root of the number of participants.
With four nations, the costs of developing a project would be twice as
much as doing it alone. With the two nations, the costs can amount to 1.4.
However, the partners share these additional costs so that each nation has
lower development costs compared with a single national venture
shouldering the entire program singly.54 Although the aggregate costs
increase due to cooperation, costs per nation decrease, which allows them
to partake in the development of technology that they would not afford on
their own. Pugh also shows that collaboration increases development costs
as the number of nations rise. With two nations development costs being
about 1.5, with three nations by about 1.8, and with four nations about 1.95
of single-nation projects. It is important to take into consideration,
though, the fact that along with the drop in development costs per country,
the increase in output affects the costs negatively. In general, the output
doubling should result in a reduction in unit production costs of up to 10
percent.55 Below, there are few examples of current military projects in
which NATO's great powers have cooperated extensively since the end of
the Cold War.
NATO members’ Common Weapon Projects
Decreased economic costs provide significant incentives for states to
cooperate. These are expenditures that take place during research and
development (R&D) and production processes. Collaborating nations can
share R&D costs, and they can achieve economies of scale and learn
through increased production. For example, if two nations were intending
to develop a similar high-tech weapon, which would cost them billions of
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dollars in research, they would be duplicating their resources if they
invested in R&D separately. Additionally, they would fail to take advantage
of economies of scale, which comes with larger batches of production.
Common projects would allow nations to save considerable resources. If
all remains unchanged, two-nation collaboration with equal sharing will
save half of the development costs for each nation in the example, and
savings in unit production costs from a larger output.56 For instance, the
doubling of output in aircraft production from 300 to 600 units might lead
to savings in unit production costs of some 5 percent. If a single aircraft
costs about 50 million per unit, savings are 2.5 million per unit. Twonation collaboration would avoid duplication of resources and save little
over 5 billion for each nation.57
The Typhoon plane program is the top multinational project among
NATO's European members. The cost of development of the plane is over
54 billion Euros. Moreover, the Typhoon project has affected about a
hundred thousand jobs in over four hundred European companies. Britain
received 40,000 of these jobs, with Spain obtaining 25,000, and Italy and
Germany about 20,000 each. A large part of these jobs is highly skilled in
creating significant externalities for the rest of the economy. Skills from
Typhoon production are transferable to many other industries as well.
Typhoon scores more highly on gains from scale and learning through
combining.58 This result is an important spillover effect. Technologies
developed for defense will lead to advances in other industrial areas. The
literature often overlooks this economic benefit.
Substantial economies of scale characterize aircraft production. Gains
from production augmented as the quantity of production increased
exponentially. Typhoon production benefits from learning with an average
85 percent learning curve and typically a 90 percent learning curve for
combined labor and other operations.59 On Typhoon, learning was
substantial over the first 60 units. Both Typhoon and Airbus have
significantly improved the learning scale compared to previous
generations. This example suggests that European aircraft production
continuously improves in the learning scale, which manifests itself in
productivity improvement and a downward shift in the average cost of
production.
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The Typhoon brings significant industrial benefits. It allows the European
aircraft industry to remain competitive, but also, allows Europeans to
remain independent and feel secure in case of conflicts.60 Some critiques
claim that Typhoon remains more expensive compared to other aircraft.
Data confirms the criticism. Typhoon is about 20-60 percent more
expensive than, for example, French Rafale. On a unit total cost basis, the
French Rafale is about 10 percent less expensive than the Typhoon while
the Swedish Gripen is about 50 percent less expensive.61
In response, it is crucial to note that comparing only prices confuses rather
than clarifies. Prices say nothing about the operational efficiency of the
aircraft. The Typhoon is a superior aircraft to the French Rafale. R&D
costs for the Typhoon are around $23.5 billion, and the Rafale is about
$21.9 billion. The Typhoon is more expensive than the Rafale. However,
four states share the R&D costs of the Typhoon. France incurred R&D
costs solely. The Gripen costs about 6-8 billion Euros. However, it is
smaller and more basic, with many combat disadvantages. The Typhoon
has significant combat advantages over both the Rafale and the Gripen.62
The price and battle effectiveness data in Table 1 demonstrate that the
Typhoon is the best combat plane among European produced planes.
Table 1. Relative Combat Effectiveness
Aircraft Model

Combat Effective Percentage

F-22

0.91

Typhoon
F-15F
Rafale
F-18E/F Super Hornet
F-16C
F-18 Hornet

0.82
0.60
0.50
0.25
0.21
0.21

Source: Authors
Note: Combat effectiveness rating of 1.0 means that the aircraft will always win a combat
engagement; 0.5 means that it has an even chance and less than 0.5 means that it will
usually lose.

Other examples of collaborative projects in NATO also confirm that joint
production brings considerable benefits. Collaborative development
compared with national alternatives can be about 140 percent for two
nations (for example, Merlin helicopter), 161–179 percent for three nations
(for example, the Tornado), and almost twice as high for four nations (for
example, the Eurofighter). Despite higher aggregate development costs of
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collaboration, each partner only bears its share of these costs.
Consequently, costs savings accrue to the nations involved in collaborative
development work. Western Europeans are also cooperating in the
production of missiles through a company called MBDA. The collaboration
became highly successful and prosperous to the point that MBDA is now a
primary competitor of one of the major global missile company, Raytheon,
from the United States. Besides, the English and French have cooperated
in the Storm Shadow missile project. Similarly, the Meteor air-to-air
missile is showing promise with the United Kingdom acting as the lead on
a six-nation international program, also involving France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and Sweden.
Logistical support can also bring substantial economic benefits. The
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, and France have been
cooperating in the logistical support of Spey, Olympus and Tyne marine
engines. According to rough estimates, such cooperation has saved
participating nations about 30 percent in maintenance services. The
United Kingdom and the United States benefit considerably from their
cooperation in Multi-Launch Rocket System and the Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile. They have benefited from the economies of scale through
joint purchasing of spare parts and shared maintenance facilities. 63
Western Europeans have successfully cooperated in other helicopter and
missile programs. Among them, the NH90 helicopter is essential. The
NH90 helicopter is a four-nation collaboration to develop and build a
medium-sized multi-role military helicopter. The manufacturers of the
helicopter are N.H. Industries (France and Germany), AgustaWestland,
and Fokker Aerostructures. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Helicopter
Management Agency (NAHEMA) manages the program for participating
NATO members. There are six assembly lines in locations in France,
Germany, Italy, Finland, Spain, and Australia. This multinational program
sold in 2011 five hundred seventy-three helicopters. European
collaboration in helicopters created two industrial groups, competing
against the U.S. helicopter industry.
The United Kingdom’s Department of Defense estimates that collaboration
with partners in research brings benefits almost five times the original
investment. Collaboration with partners provides access to the necessary
technology, saves duplicated costs, and, allows efficient management of a
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limited budget. The U.K. Department of Defense spends little over 40
million pounds on collaborative programs with other nations, less than 10
percent of its defense budget. However, according to their estimate, they
obtain technology worth approximately £200 million– a 5:1 return on its
investment.64
Other Collective Military Technology Collaborative Projects
Helios 1: The Helios is a military reconnaissance system launched in 1995.
The French, Italian, and Spanish governments funded this project. The
Helios-1A and Helios-1B are two optical satellites, the first one launched in
July 1995, and the second one within a four-year interval, which can
acquire high-resolution images of any point on the globe. The French
Ministry of Defense is responsible for the management of the satellites.
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany retain access to the imagery. Helios1A was operative until 2012, while Helios-1B lasted for four more years.65
France funded approximately 80 percent of the project, which sums to a
little bit over $1.2 billion. Italians make up about 15 percent—about $240
million. Spain covers the rest of the expenses—close to $119 million.
The Helios 2 comprises Helios 2A and Helios 2B. Both satellites serve
military observation purposes. France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece
cooperated in the creation and launch of the satellites. Helios 2A launched
in 2004, and Helios 2B followed five years later.66 The Helios 2 is an
improved version of Helios 1 satellite with improved optical sensors and
operation capability in adverse weather conditions. It disposes of higher
resolution, more accuracy, nocturnal mode, and faster data transfer
capability. At the outset, France was the project's only sponsor, but in
2001, Belgium and Spain joined to contribute together about 6 percent of
the total costs, about 120 million Euros of the total 2280 million.67
CSO Project: A few states planned to produce Helios 3A and 3B by 2012 or
2013. However, budgetary difficulties forced the cancelation of the project.
France decides to continue on its own and labels the project CSO—
translated from French, meaning Optical Space Component. After long
and arduous bargaining with the Germans, France agreed to fund about
200 million Euros of CSO satellite. The Germans will not be involved in
the production process. Sweden is also a participant in the program. It will
provide a polar ground station. This project should improve the timeliness
of the data significantly, so crucial during military operations.68
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Conclusions: Economic Imperatives and Bandwagon Alignment
Strategy
The article explained the concept of market imperfections. It analyzed a
few NATO projects to show that gains and costs savings from
multinational cooperation, given market imperfections and cost sharing,
are sizeable and produce technological spillover effects to other industrial
areas of the national economies. NATO states are more likely to continue
and strengthen military-technological cooperation in the presence of
market imperfections—to save costs—even if they face a minimal external
threat. The great European and North American powers appear to have
benefited from joint projects. By taking advantage of market
imperfections, they preserved and even increased power capabilities
despite spending less.
General review and analysis of available data suggest that the political
economy of military production is an essential causal variable in the
alliance politics among great powers. The study elucidates why states
continue to ally in the absence of external threats. Moreover, it suggests
that Schweller's logic in the theory of balance-of-interests is generally
valid, mainly when taking into consideration economic variables that can
also explain military cooperation of great powers in times of peace. On a
larger scale, the study demonstrates that the incorporation of politicaleconomic variables enriches the realist theory on military alliance
dynamics.
The study suggests that military power has a unique quality. It can
increase exponentially in ratio to inputs. This finding is important because
states might decide to cooperate in the amassing of this power by pulling
their resources together. Following this multilateral approach, they can
generate more power, using fewer resources, than by pursuing a single
tactic. Moreover, cooperation would make sense even if states would want
to generate the same amount of power accessible on their own, only
because it would cost them significantly less. Hence, the study suggests
that the logic of Schweller's balance-of-interest thesis works in times of
peace as well. Status quo powers will cooperate, and they do not need
external threats to do so as long as there remains the possibility of gains in
the form of economic incentives. In closing, it appears from the above
discussion that as long as states' interests are compatible and economic
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calculations and incentives remain strong and viable; these will bind great
powers together in internal and continued collaboration for the sake of
obtaining and maximizing gains beyond political, ideological, and national
security objectives.
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